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STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN MENTAL
COMMITMENT AND RELEASE PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
Involuntary commitment' for mental disorders is a problem which
affects a surprising number of Americans each year.' Historically, the
procedural safeguards for the commitment process were either non-
existent or grossly inadequate.3 Recently, however, the Minnesota Legis-
lature enacted reforms' which have improved the prospective patient's
1. The Minnesota mental commitment statute provides for three methods of entry into
a mental health facility: (1) informal hospitalization by consent, MINN. STAT. § 253A.03
(1976); (2) emergency hospitalization, id. § 253A.04; and (3) involuntary judicial commit-
ment, id. § 253A.07. This Note will be concerned only with the release of persons under
an involuntary judicial commitment, because under the informal or the emergency provi-
sions release is granted within a specific time after request unless a petition for involuntary
commitment is presented within that time. See id. § 253A.03(1) (person who consents to
informal hospitalization "shall be free to leave the hospital within 12 hours of his re-
quest"); id. § 253A.04(3) (person admitted under the emergency hospitalization method
may be held for up to 72 hours). Of course, a petition often is filed for involuntary
commitment after the person is already hospitalized under either the informal or emer-
gency admission.
2. In the year from June 30, 1975 to June 30, 1976, 243 persons were committed to
Minnesota state mental health facilities as mentally ill, and an additional 12 as mentally
ill and dangerous. Letter from Thyrza Tyrrell, Office of Research and Statistics, Depart-
ment of Public Welfare to William Mitchell Law Review (May 3, 1977). It has been
estimated that one person in ten will have a significant mental illness in his lifetime. R.
ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 1 (1968). This means that one
out of every three families in this country will be affected by the hospitalization of one of
their members under a mental commitment. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1961) (statement of Alexander Wiley). The increasing
magnitude of the problem and its growing legal implications are emphasized by the fact
that the number of mental patients committed approximates, if not exceeds, the number
of criminals sentenced and institutionalized in the same period of time. For example, in
1970, the number of inmates in correctional institutions in the United States was 328,020,
whereas the number of persons in mental hospitals was 433,890. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1974, at 45 (95th
ed. 1974).
3. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 5-7 (rev. ed.
S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971); R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 14. The earliest public concern
with the confinement of the mentally ill was primarily for the protection of society. The
commitment process in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was extremely
informal, consisting mainly of an interested party's request for the hospitalization of a
person. In the colonial period, those considered dangerous were jailed and the others were
treated as paupers. Only in the latter part of the nineteenth century was attention given
to the protection of the patient's rights. See id. at 12. See generally AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, supra at 1-14.
4. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 482, 1974 Minn. Laws 1209 (codified in scattered sections
of 253A, MINN. STAT.). See generally Developments in Minnesota Law - Civil
Commitment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 791, 797-99 (1975).
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constitutional safeguards at the commitment hearing, during confine-
ment, and at the review proceedings. While these statutory reforms were
definitely a positive development, they solved only a part of the prob-
lem, because the issues of the proper standard and burden of proof in
the commitment and release processes5 were left unresolved.
These remaining issues have not been discussed frequently by the
courts or commentators, and what discussion does exist indicates con-
flicting opinions. These differences of opinion stem largely from the
dual, civil-criminal nature of mental commitments. Although the pro-
ceedings are characterized as civil, a commitment is similar in many
respects to a criminal conviction, especially if a person is committed as
mentally ill and dangerous' and is not amenable to corrective treatment.
Unlike the criminal, however, the civilly committed person may be con-
fined involuntarily for an indefinite, potentially permanent term., Con-
sequently, procedural safeguards such as the proper standard and bur-
den of proof are of crucial significance in ensuring that the person's
5. Review and release procedures are the aspects of the mental commitment area most
neglected by the legal and medical professions. Because of the indeterminate nature of
the commitment, many of the existent problems of hospitalization are actually those of
release. See R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 261-62.
6. The state has two possible bases for the involuntary civil commitment of a person
as mentally ill. The parens patriae power allows protection of persons who are incapable
of protecting themselves, and the police power gives protection to society from individuals
judged to endanger the public in some way.
The parens patriae rationale is the most frequently used basis for commitment. The
assumption is that society has the duty to commit for treatment people who are suffi-
ciently mentally disabled so as to be unable to decide on treatment for themselves. See
Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945,
956-57 (1959). See generally O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580-85 (1975) (Burger,
C. J., concurring); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1207-19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. However, "the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (C. Shields ed.
1956). See generally T. SzAsz, LAW, LI'ERTY, AND PSYCIATRv 223-36 (1963).
The police power is often considered the most essential and least limited of governmen-
tal powers. See District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909) (dictum). There
is no question but that the state can deprive a person of his liberty as punishment for
various actions. The question is whether the mere potential of harmful behavior is suffi-
cient justification. See Ross, supra at 955-56; Developments, supra at 1228-35.
7. The Minnesota statute provides for an initial commitment of no longer than 60 days
during which the proposed patient is observed and receives treatment. After that time a
judicial hearing must be held to determine the patient's current mental state. If the
evidence of the medical record and the testimony presented at the hearing then indicate
continued hospitalization is necessary, the patient may be indeterminately committed.
See MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(17), (23), (25) (1976). Most state statutes have this type of
provision rather than one allowing for specified determinate periods for recommitment.
Therefore, most mental patients are committed indefinitely. See generally AMaalcAN BAR
FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 49-59.'
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constitutional rights are not violated.'
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently discussed these issues in In
re Lausche,9 holding that the burden of proof at release proceedings is
on the patient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his
confinement should be ended. The court stated in dictum, however, that
the burden at the original commitment is upon the party seeking com-
mitment and the standard is the criminal one of beyond a reasonable
doubt.0
This Note discusses Minnesota's treatment of the standard and bur-
den of proof in commitment and release proceedings, analyzes develop-
ments in other jurisdictions, and suggests common law and statutory
approaches for balancing the rights of the patient with the interest of
the state in keeping mentally ill and dangerous persons confined.
I. CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR COMMITMENT AND RELEASE IN MINNESOTA
Prior to an examination of the placement of the burden and standard
of proof in mental commitment and release proceedings, an understand-
ing of the mental commitment process is necessary.
Two categories of mentally ill persons exist in Minnesota."' A person
may be found to be mentally ill or mentally ill and dangerous. A
"mentally ill" person has been defined by the Minnesota Legislature as
a person who has a psychiatric or other disorder which substantially
impairs his mental health and who requires care and treatment." A
mentally ill person may be committed if his conduct indicates his self-
control, judgment, and ability to handle his own affairs is lessened to
the extent that hospitalization is necessary for his welfare or the protec-
tion of society.' Before a person can be committed as mentally ill and
dangerous, an additional requirement must be satisfied; the person
must be found dangerous to the public." When making the decision to
8. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the nature of the interests
involved when a person is involuntarily committed are within the fourteenth amendment
due process clause); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge
court), vacated and remanded on other grounds per curiam, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
9. 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975).
10. In re Lausche, 302 Minn. 65, 69, 225 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1974) (dictum), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 993 (1975).
11. This Note is concerned only with commitments and releases under MINN. STAT. ch.
253A (1976). Those persons committed as mentally deficient or inebriate are not included
in the discussion.
12. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.02(3) (1976).
13. See id. § 253A.07(17) (a). The statute requires that evidence of the person's conduct
clearly show (1) he has attempted to or threatened to take his own life or attempted to do
serious physical harm to himself or others; or (2) he has failed to protect himself from
exploitation from others; or (3) he has failed to care for his own needs for food, clothing,
shelter, safety, or medical care. See id.
14. See id. § 253A.07(17)(c).
19771
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commit, the court must consider the specific acts of the patient and the
alternatives to involuntary commitment, 5 and must state for the record
The obvious problems involved in finding a person "dangerous to the public" are pri-
marily the difficulties of defining and predicting "dangerousness." Dangerousness to oth-
ers involves consideration of three basic factors: the definition of dangerous conduct; the
likelihood that a person will behave in a dangerous way if not confined; and the amount
and type of evidence necessary to determine the first two factors.
A definition of dangerous behavior is generally expected to include the commission of a
violent overt act against another person in the prospective patient's recent past. See
generally Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness-Some Observations on
the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 230
(1960); Developments, supra note 6, at 1236-40.
The most oft-quoted statistics on the predictability of dangerous behavior are based on
a study of 969 mentally ill and dangerous patients who were released after the decision in
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The 969 patients had been confined in maximum
security mental hospitals because of a determination that they were mentally ill and too
dangerous to be released or committed to civil hospitals. One year after they were released
or transferred, 147 had been sent into the community and the 702 other patients presented
no problems to the minimum security hospitals. After several years, 27% were living
normal lives in the community, only two had been convicted of a felony, and only 3% were
in either a correctional institution or a hospital for the criminally insane. See Ennis &
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom,
62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 712 (1974). See generally Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After
One Year, 124 Am. J. PSYCH. 974, 976 (1968); Steadman & Keveles, The Community
Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-70, 129 AM. J. PSYCH.
309 (1972). Another study on the prediction of dangerousness in criminal offenders in-
cluded thorough clinical studies of persons convicted of serious assaults. A team of psychi-
atrists attempted predictions of dangerousness prior to court action regarding the patients'
release or confinement. The results showed an 8% recidivism rate for the group classified
as not dangerous and released upon the recommendation of the psychiatrists, and a 34.7%
recidivism rate for the group considered dangerous by the psychiatrists and released by
the courts. See Kozol, Boucher, & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of
Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELIN. 371, 377-78, 389-90 (1972). But see Monahan,
Dangerous Offenders: A Critique of Kozol, et al., 19 CRIME & DELIN. 418 (1973) (letter to
the editor) (takes issue with the thesis that dangerousness can be readily diagnosed and
treated). Many psychiatrists themselves admit that their ability to predict future danger-
ousness is no more reliable than the layman's, and to date there seems to be no accurate
scale or list of suspect characteristics upon which to base a prediction. But see In re
Alexander, 336 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (D.D.C. 1972) (psychiatrists lend expertise to statutory
construction of "dangerousness" that will prevent arbitrary commitment). See generally
Cocozza & Steadman, Some Refinements in the Measurement and Prediction of Danger-
ous Behavior, 131 Am. J. PSYCH. 1012, 1014 (1974); Megaree, The Prediction of Violence
with Psychological Tests, 2 CURRENT Topics IN CLINICAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 97 (C.
Spielberger ed. 1970); Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27
ARCHIvEs GEN. PSYCH. 397 (1972). In studies made of California's determinate commit-
ment statutes requiring overt acts of violence toward another person, it was found that
the mandatory release of dangerous patients did not increase the community's risk. A.
URMER, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-1970), reprinted in F.
MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS 267 (2d ed. 1976).
15. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(17)(a) (1976). The reasonable alternative dispositions
to be considered include, but are not limited to, dismissal of the petition, care as an out-
patient, informal or voluntary hospitalization in a private or public facility, appointment
[Vol. 3
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why those alternatives were rejected."6
A person committed as mentally ill may obtain his release by convinc-
ing the head of the hospital that he is no longer in need of institutional
care and treatment. 7 The procedures by which a person committed as
mentally ill and dangerous is released are very demanding. He must
appear before a special review board which determines whether he is
capable of making a satisfactory adjustment in society." The Commis-
sioner of Public Welfare will order the patient's release upon the special
review board's recommendation," and unless a petition is filed by an
aggrieved party2 the commitment is terminated. If a petition is filed,
the final decision will be made by an appeal board consisting of three
probate judges.2 '
of a guardian, or release prior to commitment. See id. Thus, involuntary commitment is
tolerated only as a last resort. Cf. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501-02 (D. Minn.
1974) (due process requires good faith attempt to place mentally retarded persons commit-
ted involuntarily in settings least restrictive of their liberties); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960) (any deprivation of a citizen's rights must be obtained by the least restric-
tive alternatives). But see State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969) (absent
statutory duty to seek alternatives to complete institutionalization, no duty to consider
less drastic alternatives). See generally Lake v. Cameron, 267 F. Supp. 155 (D.D.C. 1967)
(burden on court with assistance of government to explore least restrictive alternatives to
commitment); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MIcu. L. Rav. 1107, 1145-200 (1972);
Developments, supra note 6, at 1245-53. Police power commitments are influenced by the
doctrine of the least restrictive alternatives because court decisions suggest that confine-
ment must be discarded when another means of achieving the state's goal would be
effective and would also lessen the restrictions placed on the individual. See Develop-
ments, supra at 1249-50.
16. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(13) (1976).
17. See id. § 253A.15(1). The head of the hospital has sole discretion in deciding a
mental patient's readiness for release unless the patient has been charged with or con-
victed of a criminal offense. See id. Of course, in any kind of commitment, release by
habeas corpus remains an alternative. See id. § 253A.21(3). In Minnesota, the writ of
habeas corpus is available only to test the legality of the original detention and is, there-
fore, theoretically of no use if the patient was committed properly but is now recovered
and entitled to release under existing standards. See State ex rel. Anderson v. United
States Veterans Hosp., 268 Minn. 213, 128 N.W.2d 710 (1964) (scope of habeas corpus
inquiry limited to determination of whether committing court acted without jurisdiction
over subject matter or person, whether law pursuant to which proceedings were taken is
unconstitutional and hence void, and whether detention violated constitutional rights).
Some jurisdictions have now extended the remedy if no proper treatment is being ac-
corded. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (right to treatment
cognizable in habeas corpus), commented on in Note, 45 TEx. L. Rav. 777 (1967); Hiatt
v. Soucek, 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W.2d 432 (1949), discussed in Ross, Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Problem of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945, 977-78 (1959).
18. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.15(2)(a) (1976).
19. See id. § 253A.15(2)(a), (b).
20. See id. § 253A.15(2)(c). The statute permits either the patient or the county attor-
ney of the county from which the patient was committed to appeal. See id.
21. See id. § 253A.15(2)(b). The final orders of this board will supersede the commis-
19771
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Although the statutes set forth the procedures for judicial commit-
ment and release, they do not specify upon whom the burden should be
placed at these proceedings or what standard of proof must be met.
Therefore, both the holding and dictum in Lausche embody the law
regarding the burden and standard of proof in the mental commitment
process in Minnesota today.
Ill. BURDEN OF PROOF
Although for purpose of analysis the burden and standard of proof will
be discussed separately, in reality they must be considered together to
assess their effect on the mental commitment and release processes. The
interrelationship between the burden and standard of proof is extremely
important because a shifting of the former can affect fundamentally the
impact of the latter, and the two combined establish the protection
provided the patient in the proceedings. The burden of proof, however,
is especially crucial, because if it is placed on the patient, he may be
committed or refused release merely because he cannot prove effectively
that he is neither mentally ill nor dangerous.
A. The Present Rule
The placement of the burden of proof never has been at issue in
original commitment proceedings, where it is placed upon the party
advocating the commitment.2 It has caused problems, however, in re-
lease proceedings. In Lausche, the Minnesota Supreme Court consid-
ered the issue of placement of the burden of proof in the release proceed-
ings of a patient committed as mentally ill and dangerous. The special
review board and the appeal panel both placed the burden of proof on
the patient to show that he was capable of making an adequate adjust-
ment in society.Y The supreme court agreed .2 The apparent justifica-
tion for the court's holding is found in the analogous In re Masters2 case,
where the court held that the burden was on the petitioner to prove his
mental capacity by a "fair preponderance of the evidence," stating that
sioner's orders in all cases. See id. § 253A.15(2)(c).
22. Cf. McEleney v. Donovan, 119 Minn. 294, 138 N.W. 306 (1912) (burden of persua-
sion rests upon proponent to establish the claim). See generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
23. The chief judge of the appeal panel stated that "[tihe procedure isn't too well
described in the statute. I assume that, of course, this is a trial or hearing de novo, and
the burden would be on the ward to establish his entitlement to discharge under the
statute." Brief for Appellant at 20, In re Lausche, 302 Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975).
24. See In re Lausche, 302 Minn. 65, 70, 225 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 993 (1975).
25. 216 Minn. 553, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944).
[Vol. 3
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the law assumes that insanity once shown will continue to exist.2 The
Masters court indicated that the interests of both society and the pa-
tient could be balanced best by placing the burden on the patient and
requiring him to meet the less formidable civil standard rather than the
formerly used standard of "clear and convincing evidence."' In
Lausche, the court provided additional justification for its treatment of
the burden of proof, stressing that if the burden is not placed upon the
patient seeking release, the state at each release proceeding would have
the same burden of proof as at the original commitment hearings. In
effect, the court reasoned that whenever a patient requests a release
hearing, the state would be required to rejustify the patient's confine-
ment with the same quantum of proof as at the original commitment-a
burden the court considered wasteful and unnecessary. 8 The court's
concern with administrative convenience, however, is not convincing,
especially when applied to a proceeding where the patient's future lib-
erty is jeopardized.2' The following discussion suggests a more appropri-
ate method for determining the proper treatment of the burden of proof
at the release proceeding.
B. A Preferred Approach
Because the patient requesting release from hospitalization is seeking
a change in the status quo, most courts apparently have assumed that
the burden of proof should be placed upon him and not upon the party
resisting the release.30 The Masters court used the presumption of con-
26. See id. at 562, 13 N.W.2d at 492 (restoration to capacity of a feeble-minded person).
27. See id.
28. See In re Lausche, 302 Minn. 65, 70, 225 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 993 (1975). The court stated that "[to apply the higher standard to these proceed-
ings would establish a procedure in which every patient committed as mentally ill and
dangerous would require a recommitment every few months at his insistence." See id.
Presumably the court meant to refer to the burden rather than the standard, because the
patient obviously did not want the higher standard of proof if the burden was placed upon
him.
29. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.) ("Humane
considerations and constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or
limited by dollar considerations .... ). See also Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st
Cir. 1972); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 687 (D. Mass.
1973) (incarceration of unsentenced inmates), af/'d, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied
sub nor. Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Martarella v. Kelley,
359 F. Supp. 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("constitutional rights cannot be denied on account
of inadequacy of government resources"); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 377 (M.D.
Ala. 1972) (lack of funds no excuse for inadequate treatment of mentally ill), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (expediency of adminis-
tration no justification); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
30. See, e.g., Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Overholser v.
O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, C.J.); Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281
19771
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tinued mental illness as the primary reason for placing the burden of
proof upon the patient.3 1 A change in the status quo should not be the
sole factor considered, however. Allocation of the burden of proof tradi-
tionally turns on various factors. The other factors that should be taken
into account, in addition to placement of the burden on the party seek-
ing change, are the judicial estimate of the probabilities, fairness, and
policy considerations.3 1
1. Estimate of Probabilities
The first additional factor to be considered is the estimate of the
probabilities that one result normally will occur rather than another.
The weight of statistical data in mental commitment situations sub-
stantiates the view that at least during the early period of confinement,
the vast majority of mental patients improve sufficiently to be re-
leased. 31 Consequently, the probability is that a committed person will
improve, and the burden of proof should reflect that probability. In
addition, one of the primary justifications for commitment is to provide
treatment for the patient's mental condition;34 the Masters' presump-
F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Burger, C.J.); People v. Couvion, 33 Ill. 2d 408, 411, 211
N.E.2d 746, 749 (1965); People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic, 32 Ill. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 393
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965); Zellmer v. Catlin, 253 Iowa 1080, 1083, 114
N.W.2d 925, 926 (1962); Rosario v. State, 42 Misc. 2d 699, 702-03, 248 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737
(Ct. Cl. 1964). But see Comment, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for
Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 654-60 (1967). See
generally Szasz, Hospital Refusal to Release Mental Patient, 9 CLPv.-MAs. L. REV. 220
(1960).
31. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
32. See MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 337, at 788-89.
33. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
STATISTICAL NOTE 74: LENGTH OF STAY OF ADMISSIONS TO STATE AND COUNTY MENTAL HOSPI-
TALS, UNITED STATES 1971, at 2 (1973).
Of the 407,640 persons admitted to state and county mental hospitals during 1971,
86.9% were released within the first six months of admission, 3% died within those six
months, and 10% were kept for six months or more. The median length of stay was about
40 days. See id at 2.
In Minnesota, in the year ending June 30, 1976, approximately 399 persons were admit-
ted as mentally ill with 243 committed after admission. An additional 30 persons were
admitted as mentally ill and dangerous, and 12 of those persons were committed. In the
same year, a total of 405 persons were finally discharged from the hospital, 333 were
provisionally discharged, and an additional 415 were finally discharged from a provisional
discharge. Statistics on the average length of stay of a mental patient in a Minnesota state
hospital were unavailable at date of publication. Letter from Thyrza Tyrrell, Office of
Research and Statistics, Department of Public Welfare to William Mitchell Law Review
(May 3, 1977).
34. The right to treatment within the institution has been recognized where a patient
has been committed for the purpose of that treatment. See generally Bazelon,
Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 742 (1969); Birnbaum, The
Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchant-
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tion of continued mental illness contradicts that fact. If the justification
is valid, the presumption should be that the patient will recover, not
that he will remain mentally ill.A
As a result of not considering the estimate of the probabilities factor,
the Masters court's placement of the burden of proof on the patient
forces him to prove the negative fact that he is no longer mentally ill.?
ing Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 755 (1969); Symposium-The Right to Treatment,
57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969); Developments, supra note 6, at 1316-51; Note, The Rights of the
Mentally Ill During Incarceration: The Developing Law, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 494 (1973);
Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. Rxv. 1134 (1967); Note, Civil Restraint,
Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
In 1973. Minnesota created a statutory right to treatment. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.17(9)
(1976). This statute provides that every person hospitalized or receiving services shall be
entitled to receive proper care and treatment aimed at making further hospitalization
unnecessary. The statute also provides for an individualized written program plan for each
patient to be reviewed at specified intervals. See id. A Minnesota case has also held that
the only constitutional justification for an abridgment of procedural rights is that the
purpose of commitment is treatment. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D.
Minn. 1974). For examples of cases discussing a statutory or combined statutory and
constitutional right to treatment, see In re Curry, 452 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Coving-
ton v. Harris, 41- F.2d 617, 625-26 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Millard
v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 353 Mass. 604, 233
N.E.2d 908 (1968).
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the subject so far was the opinion in
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S.
563 (1975), which stated that a constitutional right to treatment was based on the follow-
ing reasoning: (1) where the rationale for confinement is parens patriae, the patient is in
need of treatment, and the due process clause requires that minimally adequate treatment
must be provided so that the nature of the commitment bears a reasonable relation to its
purpose under Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); and, (2) when the three central
limitations on the government's power to detain-that detention must be in retribution
for a specific offense, that it be limited to a fixed term, and that it be only after a
proceeding which includes procedural safeguards-are absent, a quid pro quo, in this case,
adequate treatment, must be provided by the government.
Although treatment is not the primary purpose for the confinement, it is often a factor
in the decision. Therefore, the person so committed has a due process right to have that
treatment provided. The reasoning used in the sexual psychopath right to treatment cases
is similar to that used where a patient has been committed as mentally ill and dangerous.
See, e.g., Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. 11. 1973) (petition for writ of
habeas corpus brought by person confined under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1419 (1976); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (M.D.
Ala. 1973) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (treatment under Alabama's sexual psycho-
path statute must conform to minimum constitutional requirements).
35. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1391.
36. A recent Minnesota case held it is not necessary for a mental patient to prove that
no person will be endangered by her release. See Warner v. State, - Minn. -, 244
N.W.2d 640 (1976). Although Mrs. Warner had been committed under MINN. STAT. §
631.19 (1974) (superseded by MINN. R. CalM. P. 20) (acquitted of murder by reason of
insanity) rather than under the civil commitment procedure, the implications of the
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Such a requirement is troublesome and inequitable, especially for a
mentally ill and dangerous patient, because even if he shows that he has
committed no recent overt dangerous acts, the state can rationalize this
by the fact that he has been confined and has had little opportunity to
commit such acts. Any factual evidence the "dangerous" patient can
present in his own behalf rarely is enough to meet the burden. When the
placement of the burden on the patient is coupled with the statutory
provisions for indefinite commitment,37 the result is that the patient,
even if he has recovered, can seldom prove he is no longer dangerous.
Therefore, the Masters' rule is unfair, against the weight of available
medical evidence, and contrary to the underlying purposes of commit-
ment.
2. Policy and Fairness
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the allocation of the
burden of proof should be based primarily upon considerations of policy
and fairness.3 These considerations also apply in commitment and-re-
lease proceedings; the patient should not have the burden of proving he
is no longer mentally ill or mentally ill and dangerous. The physical and
mental control the hospital staff exercises over the patient39 presents
holding are applicable to a patient committed as mentally ill and dangerous. The Warner
court found that the patient need only show that the possibility of a relapse is slight, and
that there is no reason to believe that a reoccurrence will constitute a danger to herself or
others. See - Minn. at __ , 244 N.W.2d at 643. Despite the existence of various state
statutory standards governing release of mental patients, a 1968 study of hospital prac-
tices found that actual discharge depends primarily on the determination of whether the
patient can "get along in the community." See R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 215-16. MINN.
STAT. § 253A.15(1) (1976) provides that the head of the hospital shall discharge a patient
when he is no longer in need of institutional care and treatment. But a dangerous or
psychopathic personality cannot be discharged unless the special review board advises the
Commissioner of Public Welfare that the patient is capable of making an acceptable
adjustment in society. See id. § 253A.15(2).
37. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
38, See Rustad v. Great N. Ry., 122 Minn. 453, 456, 142 N.W. 727, 728 (1913).
39. Besides the obvious control the hospital has over the physical person of the patient
in its custody, the use of tranquilizers and other drugs can inhibit the person's ability to
assist his counsel in preparing a defense. In addition, the state has control over both the
possession and contents of most of the psychiatric and hospital reports used as evidence.
Because the proceedings are civil in nature, it is usually held that the patient has no fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, -
W. Va. -, -, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (1974). Therefore, the doctors can use his state-
ments or his lack of cooperation as evidence against him. Compare In re Maddox, 351
Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958) with People v. Bruckman, 33 Ill.2d 150, 210 N.E.2d 537
(1965). But in Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101-02 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-
judge court), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam),
a three-judge federal district court considered the patient's right to remain silent in a
psychiatric interview and held that the fifth amendment privilege was an element of due
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perhaps the greatest problem when he is seeking his release. When mak-
ing its recommendations, the special review board relies on the patient's
hospital record 0 as evidence of his improvement and renewed ability to
adjust to society. Normally, however, that record is not only physically
more accessible to the hospital staff than to the patient or his counsel,"'
but the actual contents of the record are written by the staff. The review
of a mental commitment is a unique situation in that the very persons
providing the primary evidence on which the patient must rely are also
often his adversaries in regard to the matter at issue. 2 This is not to
process in civil commitment. Contra, Developments, supra note 6, at 1303-12 (concluding
Lessard holding erroneous regarding self-incrimination).
40. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.16(4) (1976). This statute provides that "[tihe board may
examine the records of all patients admitted and may examine personally at its own
instigation all patients who from the records or otherwise appear to justify reasonable
doubt as to continued need of confinement in a mental hospital."
41. The patient may have a difficult time getting information and evidence for his own
case. See R. Rankin & W. Dallmayr, Rights of Patients in Mental Hospitals, 329, 334,
reprinted in Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961). His right to talk to or interview outsiders may be limited, and if the patient is
indigent, access to counsel and independent psychiatric help is additionally difficult. See
id. at 342-43. See also Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy,
57 MICH. L. REv. 945, 995-98 (1959). Although MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(15) (1976) requires
counsel to be appointed upon request and MINN. STAT. § 253A.05(1) (1976) establishes the
right to consult privately with counsel, often as a practical matter very little time is
actually spent in consultation with the patient.
The argument is sometimes put forth that the hospital should also be required to furnish
the patient with medical assistance for the hearing. South Dakota allows a patient to
request appointment of an independent doctor for consultation. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 27A-9-17 (1976). See generally In re Gannon, 123 N.J. Super. 104, 301 A.2d 493 (Somer-
set County Ct. 1973) (due process includes right to an independent psychiatric examina-
tion); Perr, Independent Examination of Patients Hospitalized Against Their Will, 131
AM. J. PSYCH. 765 (1974) (case studies of nine hospitalizations where private attorney
requested independent psychiatric review demonstrates that three were hospitalized un-
meritoriously).
42. The hospital staff which is supposed to aid the patient will very often be the force
which opposes him in his desire to gain release. See, e.g., Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d
1076, 1086 (1st Cir. 1973) (psychiatrist who determines person should be committed be-
comes a prosecutor). Dr. T. Szasz vehemently argues against this inherent adversary
nature of the commitment process and insists that the mental patient must have full due
process rights. See Szasz, Hospital's Refusal to Release Mental Patient, 9 CLEv.-MAR. L.
REv. 220 (1960). Dr. Szasz stated:
My judgment will be considered correct, however, if due process in psychiatric
affairs requires, first, that psychiatrists not mislead patients to believe they will
help them, when, in fact, they are the agents of another party; and, second, that
in each case in which psychiatry is used as a social force against a person, he
will have equal access to psychiatric authority to use on his own behalf.
T. SzAsz, supra note 6, at 190. But see Davidson, Mental Hospitals and the Civil Liberties
Dilemma, 51 MENTAL HYGIENE 371 (1967). For a general discussion of the court's role
versus that of the hospital, see Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and
the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 897 (1975).
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suggest that either the doctors on the hospital staff or those on the board
consciously wish to keep patients confined unjustifiably. Nonetheless,
psychiatrists trained in diagnosis tend to see symptoms of mental illness
where none exist. 3 The evidence they place in the medical record also
is questionable because uniform diagnosis of the mental condition and
prediction of continued mental illness and dangerousness is almost im-
possible to achieve." This lack of uniformity works against the patient
at the review, because it is possible for a person to be committed upon
the testimony of only one psychiatrist, 5 but seldom will a person be
43. Dr. Szasz has stated:
As judges and juries must decide whether a person is guilty or innocent, so
physicians must decide whether a person is sick or well. Unfortunately, the rules
governing the medical game are less explicitly formulated than those determin-
ing criminality. Physicians are taught always to suspect illness. Thus, they
usually follow the rule that once a person is suspected of being ill, he should be
considered sick until proved healthy.
T. SZASZ, supra note 6, at 224. See generally B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL
PATIENTS 292 (1973) ("Psychiatrists find what they expect to find"); Temerlin, Diagnostic
Bias in Community Mental Health, 6 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 110 (1970) (diagnosis
of one psychiatrist has biasing effect on later diagnosis of another psychiatrist); Temerlin,
Suggestion Effects in Psychiatric Diagnosis, 147 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 349 (1968)
(physicians follow the rule "when in doubt, diagnose illness," reasoning it is less dangerous
than diagnosing health when illness may be present).
44. Clinical psychiatric interviews tend to be generally unreliable because they often
last only a few minutes, are geared to the specific symptoms of the suspected illness, and
are often couched in psychiatric cliches. See Scheff, The Societal Reaction to Deviance:
Ascriptive Elements in the Psychiatric Screening of Mental Patients in a Midwestern
State, 11 Soc. PROB. 401 (1964) (examiners prejudge the cases, proceed on a presumption
of illness, and limit questioning to the circumstances leading to hospitalization). The
outcome and diagnosis may depend as much on outside factors as on the answers and
behavior of the person being interviewed. The personality of the examiner is the most
important of these outside influe9 ces. Nathan, Andberg, Behan, & Patch, Thirty-Two
Observers and One Patient: A Study of Diagnostic Reliability, 25 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 9
(1969). His attitude may provoke lack of cooperation or actual hostility in the person being
examined. Sex, see P. CHESLER, WOMEN & MADNESS 32-57 (1972), race, see Katz, Cole, &
Lowery, Studies of the Diagnostic Process: The Influence of Symptom Perception, Past
Experience, and Ethnic Background on Diagnostic Decisions, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 937, 945-
46 (1969), and theoretical orientation may influence the examiner's diagnosis and recom-
mendations. Even the time and place of examination itself will vary the results. See B.
ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 292 (1973). For examples and discus-
sion of general studies of the unreliability and lack of validity of psychiatric judgments,
see Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 697, 701-08 (1974). See generally Solesbee v. Balkcom,
339 U.S. 9, 24-25 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (recognizing there are "treacherous
uncertainties in the present state of psychiatric knowledge"); J. ZiSKIN, COPING wITH
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY, 181-214 (2d ed. 1975); Ash, The Reliability of
Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 272 (1949).
45. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(2) (1976) (court to "appoint two examiners at least one
of whom shall be a licensed physician"). Technically, therefore, the examiner need not
even be a psychiatrist to qualify under statutory standards. See generally Special Project,
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released unless several psychiatrists agree that he is no longer mentally
ill.
The injustice of placing the burden of proof on the committed patient
is demonstrated further by the fact that, in general, the longer a person
is confined as mentally ill, the less able he is to advocate forcefully his
right to release." Studies indicate that involuntary treatment is most
effective during the first few months of hospitalization,47 but that insti-
tutionalization for an extended period of time actually contributes to
the patient's mental deterioration and increased passivity. " Many pa-
The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIz. L.
REv. 1, 60 n.195 (1971). In addition, under the provisions of MINN. STAT. § 253A.16(1)
(1976), the board appointed to review the admission and retention of patients need include
only one person qualified in the diagnosis of mental illness.
46. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court),
vacated and remanded on other grounds per curiam, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). Even a short
detention may have long-lasting effects on an individual's ability to function in the outside
world because of acute traumatic and iatrogenic symptoms caused by the involuntary
detention itself in the alien atmosphere of the hospital. A period of time as short as several
days can cause the onset of this type of symptom and can be the beginning of a process
of institutionalization which further hinders both the patient's preparation for his hearing
and his ability to function in society if released. See id. at 1091 n.18. For an example of
how conditions in an institution for the mentally retarded can cause forms of maladjusted
behavior including aggression, autism, total withdrawal, and excessive dependency on
others, see Excerpt from Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum in New York State Associa-
tion for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, reprinted in 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY
HANDICAPPED 750-51 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973) (even a normal person placed in
such conditions will experience regression and loss of personal effectiveness).
47. See Caffey, Galbrecht, & Klett, Brief Hospitalization and Aftercare in the Treat-
ment of Schizophrenia, 24 ARcHIvEs GEN. PSYCH. 81 (1971) (short-term patients show at
least as much sustained improvement as those hospitalized for a long term); Glick, Har-
greaves, Raskin, & Kutner, Short Versus Long Term Hospitalization: A Prospective Con-
trolled Study II. Results for Schizophrenic Inpatients, 132 AM. J. PSYCH. 385 (1975) (re-
sults after study of long-term versus short-term patients are inconclusive without study
over a longer period, but seem to indicate better functioning of short-term patients); Herz,
Endicott, & Spitzer, Brief Hospitalization of Patients with Families: Initial Results, 132
AM. J. PsYcH. 413, 413 (1975) (brief hospitalization is as good as standard hospitalization
as regards symptoms and readmission rates, and is superior for role function). All three
articles emphasize, however, that the studies may not necessarily mean that a short
hospitalization is ideal for all patients.
48. See generally E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 171-320 (1961). It has been stated that the
effects of hospitalization can be so detrimental that if the patient is not released before
two years have expired, he has a very good chance of dying within the hospital. See
Bloomberg, A Proposal for a Community-Based Hospital as a Branch of a State Hospital,
116 AM. J. PSYCH. 814, 814 (1960). See also Mendel, Brief Hospitalization Techniques, 6
CURRENT PSYCH. THERAPIES 310, 315 (1966).
We must consider the following factors in each decision for hospitalization: (1)
hospitalization may offer too much dependency gratification to the patient; (2)
hospitalization may reinforce the patient's failure in life so much so that he will
give up trying to live an extramural existence; (3) removal from contact with
reality may be harmful; . . . and (5) the secondary effects of the hospitalization
may be adverse.
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tients lose even the desire to return to society after continued confine-
ment," and without this desire the ability to obtain their release is
decreased significantly. Consequently, fairness and policy considera-
tions require that the burden of proof at release proceedings be placed
on the state to help ensure that patients capable of adjusting in society
are released before the adverse effects of institutionalization impair both
their ability and desire to return to society.
Various outside influences such as family5° and community5 pressures
can also adversely affect the patient's chance of obtaining release. The
desire to relieve the family of responsibility for the patient is often a
major factor in the decision to continue his confinement. In a study
Id. It seems reasonable to assume that the effects of the institutionalization would be
magnified if the person had been diagnosed wrongly or was free of mental disorder at the
initial commitment.
The mental condition of one whose mind is so deranged as to require imprison-
ment for his own and others' good is indeed pitiable. But the mental attitude
of one who is falsely found insane and relegated to life imprisonment is beyond
conception. No greater cruelty can be committed in the name of the law.
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1400, at 201 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1974). See generally Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972).
49. See generally Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 267-68 (1969) (statement of Bruce J. Ennis); T. SZASZ, supra note 6, at 180;
Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1025, 1055 (1974).
50. The present Chief Justice, Warren Burger, in his dissent in Kent v. United States,
401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968) stated: "Lawmakers in recent years have been sensitive to
the need to make civil commitment difficult recognizing the dangers of relatives 'farming'
out their kindred into mental institutions for motives not always worthy." Id. at 416 n.4.
51. See note 77 infra. The public's aversion to contact even with the non-dangerous
retarded person is illustrated by the difficulty in avoiding zoning prohibitions against
group homes in residential areas. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Shoreview Res., Inc., No.
401575 (Minn. 2d Dist. Ct., filed June 24, 1975) (special use permit for mentally retarded
homes held valid). Minnesota has recently enacted legislation removing this legal impedi-
ment, however. MINN. STAT. § 462.357(7) (1976) provides that for zoning purposes, a state-
licensed group home for six or fewer mentally retarded individuals is to be considered a
single family residence. See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1976).
Enforcement of the statutes has been legally difficult, however, and constitutional attacks
have had limited success. See generally Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Lack of the patient's financial capability to exist in the general community may also be
a deciding factor in the decision to retain him. See N. KrrrUE, THE RIGHT TO sE DIFFERENT
95 (1971); Comment, Commitment of the Mentally Ill-Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 109, 115 (1962).
52. See Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for a
Reexamination, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1967); A. URMER, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW
MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-1970), reprinted in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, & R.
PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS 407 (2d ed. 1976); cf. R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 222
(the aged and infirm); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
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relating the length of hospitalization to various factors, the most impor-
tant was found to be the desire of the family to have the patient released
or, conversely, its desire for his continued confinement.53 This attitude
of the family seems to have even more influence with the psychiatrists
than considerations of the patient's dangerousness or psychiatric symp-
toms." In addition, the public's fear of the "dangerous" mental patient
also can influence the decision of the psychiatrist regarding a recom-
mendation to release. 5  Although available evidence establishes that the
released mental patient normally is no more dangerous than any other
citizen,56 the public outcry that ensues after the rare occasions when a
former mental patient does commit a dangerous act57 is certain to have
Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1134 (1972)
(many elderly and senile patients are committed to mental institutions simply because
there is no one willing to care for them in outside society).
53. See Greenley, The Psychiatric Patient's Family and Length of Hospitalization, 13
J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 25 (1972).
54. See id. at 31.
55. See note 56 infra. The most cursory examination of mental release cases will disclose
that fear of dangerous behavior is a most influential factor in the retention of the mental
patient.
Once a petition for release is before the court, the central issue is the possible
danger to the patient or the community that might result from release ....
[Miost judges expressed the opinion that they would order release only if
convinced that to do so would not jeopardize the welfare of the patient or the
community.
R. ROCK, supra note 2, at 239; see, e.g., In re Lausche, 302 Minn. 65, 69, 225 N.W.2d 366,
368 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975). But see Greenley, The Psychiatric Patient's
Family and Length of Hospitalization, 13 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 25, 35 (1972) (only
slight relationship between patient's potential dangerousness and family's desire for con-
tinued hospitalization).
56. See Pollak, Is the Paroled Patient a Menace to the Community?, 12 PSYCH. Q. 236,
238 (1938) (crime rate for the general public is fourteen times as high as that of paroled
patients). See generally Cohen & Freeman, How Dangerous to the Community are State
Hospital Patients?, CONN. STATE MED. J., Sept., 1945, at 697; Giovanni & Gurel, Socially
Disruptive Behavior of Ex-Mental Patients, 17 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCH. 146 (1967) (alcohol-
ism or previous arrest rate more highly associated with post-hospital arrest than the fact
of hospitalization per se); A. URMER, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL LAW (1969-
1970), reprinted in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH
PROCESS 265 (2d ed. 1976). The Giovanni study differed from all others in that all forms
of criminal activity were taken into account, whether or not an arrest had been made. But
see Rappeport & Lassen, Dangerousness-Arrest Rate Comparisons of Discharged Pa-
tients and the General Population, 121 AM. J. PSYCH. 776, 779 (1965) (former mental
patients more frequently arrested for some types of crimes).
57. Cf., e.g., Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 31, 1976, at 1B, col. 2. Recently, a $30,000 fence
was ordered built around the grounds of Anoka State Hospital. "The fence, nearly two-
fifths of a mile around, was ordered in September by Gov. Wendell Anderson. It was the
most visible response to date to what had been called 'a supercharged environment' in
Anoka following the killing. . . by a patient who escaped .... See id. A major concern
of the hospital was to "regain the confidence of the Anoka community." See id. Sept. 1,
1976, at 17A, col. 1.
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a cautioning effect on the persons considering a patient's release.
The above factors-control of records and diagnosis, length of confine-
ment, and family and community pressures-combine to make the com-
mitted person's barriers to release formidable. In a state such as Minne-
sota, where the term of commitment is indefinite, fairness and policy
considerations strongly support placement of the burden of proof upon
the party advocating continued confinement. As a matter of fairness,
the patient already has numerous disadvantages in release proceedings,
and as a matter of policy, the court should be especially protective of
the patient's liberties when confinement is potentially unlimited.
IV. STANDARD OF PROOF
As was discussed, the removal of the burden of proof from a patient
seeking his release is of limited use to him if the standard of proof is not
similarly altered to correspond to that of the original commitment pro-
ceeding. The following discussion will analyze the appropriate standard
to be used.
A. At the Commitment
The standard of proof utilized in an adjudicative proceeding repre-
sents the degree of error that should be tolerated in the fact-finding
process. For example, in criminal cases the standard has long been the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" test,5 which recognizes that a person
should not be deprived of his liberty without a high degree of certainty
that the state has met its burden." In contrast, the "preponderance of
the evidence" test generally is used in civil cases where the interests at
stake are normally economic in nature and there is less reason to tolerate
an error in the defendant's favor than an error in the plaintiffs favor."
The standard of proof, therefore, is an important procedural safeguard
that should be determined by balancing the interests at stake in the
proceeding."
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Lausche stated that the standard
of proof at the original commitment is the criminal one of beyond a
reasonable doubt. 2 Although dictum, this statement represents the first
58. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
59. See generally id. at 361-64; MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 341.
60. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Developments,
supra note 6, at 1297. See generally McCoRMICK, supra note 22, § 339.
61. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam).
62. See In re Lausche, 302 Minn. 65, 69, 225 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1974) (dictum), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975). In the past, the Minnesota court apparently has considered
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard to be the appropriate one for all stages of
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time the Minnesota court has addressed the standard of proof issue for
commitment of persons as mentally ill and dangerous. 3 The court's
conclusion is consistent with the recent handful of cases in other juris-
dictions that have considered this issue." These cases generally have
analogized commitments to juvenile65 and parole6 proceedings and have
the mental commitment process, primarily because of the civil nature of the proceedings.
See, e.g., In re Leary, 272 Minn. 34, 136 N.W.2d 552 (1965); In re Wretlind, 225 Minn.
554, 32 N.W.2d 161 (1948); In re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 562, 13 N.W.2d 487, 492 (1944)
(to obtain release must prove "present mental capacity by a fair preponderance of the
evidence"; the proof need not be "clear and satisfactory").
63. In re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944), the only other Minnesota case
to address the standard of proof issue, involved instead a petition for restoration of capac-
ity of a previously judged feeble-minded person under Act of Mar. 29, 1935, § 1P3, 1935
Minn. Laws 163 (repealed 1967) (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 525.78 (1941)).
64. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Suzuki v. Quisenberry,
411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095
(E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded on other grounds per curiam,
414 U.S. 473 (1974); cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juvenile proceedings involving
criminal charge); United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 935-37 (7th
Cir. 1975) (three-judge court) (commitment under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1419 (1976). Previously, the criminal standard had been
applied with no particular analysis or discussion as to other possibilities. See, e.g., In re
Pickles, 170 So. 2d 603, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); In re Perry, 137 N.J. Eq. 161, 43
A.2d 885 (Ch. 1945); cf. Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1964)
(commitment proceedings regarded as quasi-criminal). But see Greenberg, Involuntary
Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 227, 249-68 (1974) (use
of the criminal standard would prevent all future commitments to prevent suicide because
of the insufficient predictive accuracy). See generally Bazelon, Implementing the Right
to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 742, 748-49 (1969); Developments, supra note 6, at 1295-
1303.
Proof by the standard of "clear and convincing" evidence has also been approved. See
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court); People v.
Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 325-26, 309 N.E.2d 733, 740-41 (1974) (found the civil
standard of proof by a preponderance inadequate and proof beyond a reasonable doubt
not required by due process); In re Valdez, - N.M. -, - , 540 P.2d 818, 822-23
(1975) (beyond a reasonable doubt too stringent because psychiatry and psychology are
inexact sciences); In re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973) (en banc); State ex
rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, - W.Va. - , -. 202 S.E.2d 109, 126-27 (1974) (specifically
disapproved of proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard because medical science inex-
act); cf. Woodby v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (deportation proceed-
ings); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1051-53 (E.D. Pa.), judgment stayed 96
S.Ct. 558 (1975), prob. juris. noted, 96 S.Ct. 1457 (1976) (commitment of children). For a
discussion regarding application of the various standards of commitment of sexual psycho-
paths, see Comment, Commitment of Sexual Psychopaths and the Requirements of Proce-
dural Due Process, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 923, 940-45 (1976).
65. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court) (same), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam). Because both juvenile and mental commitment proceedings
are customarily characterized as parens patriae rather than adversary proceedings, the
courts in the past have relied on the civil nature of the process to deny the concerned
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concluded that due process in these proceedings requires the more strin-
gent criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt to balance prop-
erly the interests of the state and the prospective patient. 7
The degree of due process protection, and consequently the proper
standard of proof, depends on the interests involved, the nature of the
proceedings, and the purpose for which the proceedings exist." In civil
commitments, the state's interest and the purpose of the process depend
upon the nature of the patient's alleged illness. If the patient is mentally
ill, in need of treatment, and dangerous only to himself, 9 the state
individuals' due process. The Gault court found the distinction unpersuasive and held
that due process applies to juvenile adjudications. See 387 U.S. at 30-31. The mental
commitment cases which apply the Gault rationale emphasize the similar restrictions on
liberty and the future repercussions of a commitment that make the process similar to
the juvenile process.
66. The court in In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) based its deliberations on
the analysis of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), a habeas corpus proceeding
challenging the revocation of paroles without a hearing. The Morrissey court held that
because of the interest of the parolee in his liberty, although conditional, and the interest
of society in basic fairness, a hearing with due process protections was mandated. The
Batlay court emphasized that the arguments for various due process standards are even
more convincing in a mental commitment because the prospective patient stands to lose
his "substantial liberty" as contrasted with the conditional liberty of the parolee. See 482
F.2d at 656.
67. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded on other grounds per
curiam, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
68. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 245
(1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-
95 (1961).
69. The Minnesota statutory criteria for "dangerousness to self" include finding the
person mentally ill and
that the evidence of the proposed patient's conduct clearly shows that his cus-
tomary self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and
social relations is lessened to such an extent that hospitalization is necessary
for his own welfare or the protection of society; that is, that the evidence of his
conduct clearly shows: (i) that he has attempted to or threatened to take his
own life or attempted to seriously physically harm himself or others; or (ii) that
he has failed to protect himself from exploitation from others; or (iii) that he
has failed to care for his own needs for food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.
See MINN. STAT. § 253A.07(17)(a) (1976).
Dangerousness to self is a classification that raises issues of vagueness and predictability
in much the same way as dangerousness to others. Although protection of society from
dangerously mentally ill persons necessitates use of the police power, arguably, a person's
"right" to harm himself should be respected. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1223-28
(commitment for treatment should be restricted to the parens patriae actions, thus giving
the state no control over a competent person's refusal to accept treatment). There is,
furthermore, little evidence that suicidal tendencies are more predictable than dangerous
acts toward others, or that hospitalization in any way influences the patient's behavior.
See generally Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 227 (1974); Kiev, Prognostic Factors in Attempted Suicide, 131 AM. J.
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pursuant to its parens patriae power may commit him for the purpose
of treatment."' A person mentally ill and dangerous only to himself may
be hospitalized for an indefinite period, and the argument often is made
that less stringent procedures can be tolerated because of the state's
duty to help and care for him.71 Pursuant to the parens patriae power,
however, the state must provide treatment for the patient to justify the
continued deprivation of his liberty." In the case of a person allegedly
mentally ill and dangerous to the public, rather than only to himself,
the state cannot rely entirely on its parens patriae power to justify
commitment, but must invoke its police power instead.73 In most cases,
the primary justification for committing a person mentally ill and dan-
gerous to the public is the protection of society.74 It is this interest which
must be balanced against the committed person's substantial loss of
liberty to determine the appropriate standard of proof.75
The state's police power interest in protecting society is the justifica-
tion for both the commitment of mentally ill and dangerous persons and
the incarceration of criminals. Similarities between the consequences of
mental commitment and criminal conviction are obvious. In both, the
person suffers a substantial loss of liberty" if the state's action is suc-
cessful. In addition, both criminal and committed persons are later
stigmatized by society as a result of their confinement.77 These factors
PSYCH. 987, 989 (1974); Rosen, Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some
Limitations in the Prediction of Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 397 (1954).
A study of California's mandatory release statutes shows that the early release did not
seem to change suicidal statistics. See A. URMER, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL
HEALTH LAW (1969-1970), reprinted in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, & R. PARNAS, THE
MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS 289 (2d ed. 1976).
70. See notes 6 & 69 supra.
71. Cf. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974). However, since In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), a therapeutic intention
rather than a punitive one is irrelevant to the determination of procedural safeguards. The
consequences of the proceedings, and not the purpose, mandate that criminal standards
be used. See, e.g., id. at 36-37.
72. For a discussion of the right to treatment, see note 34 supra.
73. See note 6 supra.
74. See note 6 supra.
75. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1300-02. See generally Comment, Commitment
and Release Standards and Procedures: Uniform Treatment for the Mentally Ill, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 825 (1974).
76. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (civil commitment entails a
"massive curtailment of liberty" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment). But
see People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 260, 217 N.E.2d 636, 637, 270 N.Y.S.2d
573, 575 (1966) (Bergan, J., dissenting) (the situations in prisons and in mental hospitals
are not analogous).
77. The former mental patient is often treated in a discriminatory manner, even if he
was not declared incompetent. The general public will usually treat him with fear, mis-
trust, and dislike. He is often denied state and municipal civil service rank, is sometimes
ineligible to drive a taxicab, may be denied admission to graduate and professional
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and others indicate that the procedural safeguards provided civilly-
committed persons should be at least as protective as those granted to
criminals.7 1 The protections offered in the criminal process are evident
at every stage of the proceedings. For example, the criminal is tried in
a system which offers highly developed procedural safeguards," and he
is usually incarcerated for only a specified period of time." In addition,
the criminal has the initial advantage of statutes which give him ad-
vance knowledge of the specific behavior that will bring about his trial
and conviction. In contrast, in the commitment process persons are
faced with the inherently vague terms "mentally ill"'" and
"dangerous.""z Consequently, unless other factors merit a distinction,
the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt should be utilized
in commitment proceedings.
The argument has been made that the state interest is sufficiently
distinguishable in civil commitments of the mentally ill and dangerous
to merit a different standard of proof than that provided for criminals.
schools, and may have difficulty getting a public school teaching license. See B. ENNIS,
PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY 143-76 (1972). One state has statutory protection for former
patients against discrimination. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 15.01 (McKinney 1976)
("no person shall be deprived of any civil right ... , solely by reason of receipt of services
for a mental disability"). Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (the right to work is
protected by the fourteenth amendment). See generally L. SROLE, T. LANGNER, S.
MICHAEL, M. OPLER, & T. RENNIE, MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE METROPOLIS (1962); Reifler &
Liptzin, Entering College with a Psychiatric History, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 1625, 1629 (1969)
(study showing former mental patients not a worse risk than other college students);
Developments, supra note 6, at 1198-1201.
78. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 662-67 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1090 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded on other
grounds per curiam, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
79. See e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt
required in criminal proceedings); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-26 (1958) (burden
of proof on state); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Holt v. United States, 218
U.S. 245, 253 (1910) (Holmes, J.) (legal presumption of innocence); Miles v. United
States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880). "It is only because of historical accident that the proce-
dural safeguards developed in criminal proceedings; there is nothing inherent in criminal
proceedings that makes procedural safeguards relevant only there." L. PFEFFER, THE LiB-
ERTIES OF AN AMERICAN 162 (2d ed. 1956).
80. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
81. Commitment statutes are often constitutionally attacked as vague because they
permit great discretion in labeling someone as mentally ill. See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940) (not vague due to statutory construc-
tion); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 514 (4th Cir. 1964) (remanded to consider vague-
ness); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (three-judge court),
vacated and remanded on other grounds per curiam, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (not vague as
interpreted); Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1270-72 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge
court), aff'd mem. sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) (court declined to
consider vagueness); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, __ W.Va. -, -, 202 S.E.2d
109, 123 (1974) (standard permitting involuntary hospitalization unconstitutionally
vague).
82. See note 14 supra.
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The state, some courts have asserted, also has an interest in the treat-
ment of the patient,83 and this additional state interest may justify a less
stringent standard of proof than that used in criminal proceedings. 4
This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that confinement can and
often does have a detrimental, negative effect on mental patients, par-
ticularly when the commitment was based on wrongful information.85 In
addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated emphatically that a
mentally ill and dangerous person may be committed even if he is not
amenable to rehabilitative treatment." Thus, treatment may not be
required in Minnesota for commitment of a dangerous person.87 There-
83. In some cases, the patient may be considered virtually untreatable but the decision
may still be made to confine him because of his potential social dangerousness. See In re
Lausche, 302 Minn. 65, 69, 255 N.W.2d 366, 368 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975)
(mental patient who remains dangerous to public should not be released because there
are no medical procedures that can change his possible character disorders or other symp-
toms); cf. People v. Rancier, 240 Cal. App. 2d 579, 585, 49 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1966) (untreatable sexual psychopath to be given compulsory treatment); Barnes v.
Director of Patuxent Inst., 240 Md. 32, 212 A.2d 465 (1965) (mentally defective delin-
quent). See generally Developments in Minnesota Law-1974, 59 MINN. L. REv. 785, 791-
96 (1975). However, the assurance of treatment is a necessary justification even for persons
who have committed criminal or anti-social actions. See Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d
1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (statute committing mentally impaired criminals constitutional
where adequate treatment assured); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159 N.E.2d
82 (1959) (civil commitment of sex offenders must provide adequate treatment to be
constitutional).
84. See note 71 supra.
85. See notes 46 & 48 supra.
86. The Lausche court stated:
We would like to strongly emphasize to all those involved in the mental
commitment procedure that the ward's actual release should not be predicated
upon a prevailing opinion that treatment will not help, that hospitalization
would be in vain, and that therefore the ward should be released. If the patient
is judged mentally ill and dangerous, the rights of the public must be consid-
ered. Those who are a danger to the public are released at times because techni-
cally there are no medical procedures that can change their possible character
disorders or other symptoms. The determining question should be: If not institu-
tionalized, will they be a danger to society?
302 Minn. at 69, 225 N.W.2d at 368. The court also indicated that supervision alone might
be sufficient treatment. See id.
87. The original right to treatment case, Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (1966), sug-
gested several constitutional attacks on confinement without treatment. The primary
argument was that preventive detention for indefinite civil confinement without treat-
ment constituted cruel and inhuman punishment. See id. at 453. The eighth amendment
was interpreted in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (statute making
narcotics addiction a crime and ordering punishment for it struck down on constitutional
grounds). One reading of the Robinson dicta implies that all confinement for mental
illness without treatment could be interpreted as cruel and unusual punishment, because
the patients are not responsible for their condition. See id. at 666. One commentator has
noted:
The Robinson dicta suggesting that civil commitment is constitutional are in
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fore, the additional state interest in treatment of the patient does not
justify the imposition of a less demanding standard of proof. Conse-
quently, the Lausche dictum, that a person cannot be deprived of his
liberty except by a finding that he is mentally ill and dangerous beyond
a reasonable doubt, is sound and should be followed.
B. At the Release Proceedings
The proper standard of proof at the release proceeding cannot be
determined without first deciding which party bears the burden of proof.
For example, in Lausche, the court held that the burden of proof at
release proceedings is on the patient, but the standard of proof is the
civil one of a preponderance of the evidence. 8 Assuming, as the court
did, that the burden should be placed on the patient, the Lausche stan-
dard of proof benefits the patient. The preferred approach places the
burden on the state at release proceedings to reestablish the patient's
paragraphs expressing a favorable attitude to state action-even compulsory
state action-assuring treatment for ill citizens. But commitment of dangerous
persons is a harder case, because the chief purpose of such a measure is to afford
protection for society, not to ensure treatment for the patient. If a case arose in
which medical testimony indicated that a patient could not be helped by treat-
ment (either because no treatment was known for his illness or because the
available hospital had inadequate facilities), but he was nonetheless committed
as dangerous, the Court might well hold that the state was punishing the patient
for an illness and thus inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.
Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REv.
1288, 1291 (1966). Contra, In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489
(1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963) (confinement via commitment proceedings is not
per se cruel and unusual punishment). See generally Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness
and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decisions to Release Persons Acquitted By
Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 229 (1960) (purpose of civil commitment is to provide
dangerous mental patients with state custody even if no treatment is available);
Developments, supra note 6, at 1330-33; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the
Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 97-100 (1967).
If continued confinement for "dangerousness" is permitted where a patient has not been
determined currently mentally ill and treatable, obviously he is being detained for preven-
tive reasons. Because other dangerous persons, such as incarcerated criminals, cannot be
detained because they might be dangerous if released, permitting such preventive deten-
tion of the mental patient may fall within an equal protection argument. See Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. Rxv. 1288, 1290
(1966). If a sociologist predicted that a person was 80% likely to commit a felony, no law
would permit his confinement. Where a mental patient is declared 80% likely to commit
a dangerous act, however, there is virtually no question but that he would be committed.
It has been suggested that in the case of socially dangerous patients commitment should
be for no longer than a prison sentence would have been for the "ancestor crime" which
brought about the commitment. See generally Due Process for All-Constitutional Stan-
dards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 633 (1967). For
a discussion of the constitutionality of preventive detention, see Note, Civil Restraint,
Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
88. See 302 Minn. at 70, 225 N.W.2d at 369.
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mental illness and dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. This ap-
proach is more protective of the patient's liberty. The following discus-
sion, therefore, is based on the premise that the burden is on the state
at release proceedings.
The procedural safeguards are no less necessary at the release pro-
ceedings than at the original commitment." At the original commit-
ment, mental illness or dangerousness as to only that point in time is
established10 Continued confinement, like the initial commitment, is
justifiable only if the state's interest still substantially outweighs the
patient's right to his liberty at the time of the release proceeding?, The
United States Supreme Court has held that commitment cannot be
continued beyond a period reasonably related to its original purpose;92
it follows that a patient should be released when he no longer meets the
criteria of the original commitment. 3 However, the Minnesota Supreme
89. This area is often ignored in the commentaries. Constitutional safeguards benefit a
patient little if he is denied adequate protections at the release stage.
90. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.15(1) (1976) (patient may be discharged when he is "no
longer in need of institutional care and treatment") (emphasis added). See also NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HosPi-
TALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL § 15 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1952), reprinted
in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 454-73.
91. See generally Developments, supra note 6, at 1389-92. For a discussion of standards
of release, see note 93 infra.
92. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) the Supreme Court stated: "At the
least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reason-
able relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." The Court held that
the confinement due to lack of capacity to stand trial of a retarded person for three and a
half years without treatment violated due process because the nature of his commitment
bore no relationship to the treatment rationale of that commitment. See id. at 738. The
Court also, and perhaps more significantly, stated that due process is violated if there is
no reasonable relationship between the duration of confinement and its purpose. See id.
Therefore, the custodial detention of patients after any realistic expectation of treatment
has been exhausted would offend due process.
93. There is an inherent problem in the formulation of standards for release from a
mental institution. The requirements for commitment are statutory and judicial. Release,
however, is primarily a medical decision. Thus, a person may be considered in need of
hospitalization by a court, yet be capable of discharge under medical standards. The
converse is of more import, however, in the context of this Note. A patient may be
ineligible for release in the opinion of the head of the hospital and not allowed a discharge
pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 253A.15 (1976) even though he would not at that time meet
the standards under which he was committed. This seems contrary to the policy behind
the Draft Act which provides that the hospital administrator should order a patient's
release when his present condition or actions would not justify an initial commitment. See
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERN-
ING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY HILL § 15 (Public Health Serv. Pub. No. 51, 1952),
reprinted in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 3, at 454-73. See generally Comment,
Commitment and Release Standards and Procedures: Uniform Treatment for the Men-
tally Ill, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 825 (1974); Comment, Due Process for All-Constitutional
Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 633 (1967).
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Court's holding regarding the standard and burden of proof at release
proceedings makes possible the continued commitment of patients
even if they are not sufficiently mentally ill or dangerous to justify an
original commitment. The court accomplished this result by applying a
different standard and burden of proof scheme for release proceedings
than for the original commitment.
A Minnesota statute provides that a patient should be released when
he is "capable of making an acceptable adjustment in society,"9 which
presumably means that the patient is no longer mentally ill 5 or danger-
ous." The Lausche court held that the patient must establish his ability
to adapt to society by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 The court's
holding was based primarily on grounds of administrative convenience;
the court was concerned that the state otherwise in effect would have
to go through a new commitment process whenever the patient's status
is reviewed." This concern has some merit, because the administrative
burden definitely would be increased by requiring the state to justify
continued confinement by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Whether this inconvenience justifies lowering the patient's due process
safeguards is questionable.9 Because the patient's interest in his liberty
remains the same, the only justification for relaxed procedural safe-
guards at the release proceedings is an additional state interest which
did not exist at the original commitment. 00 The only such interest the
94. See MINN. STAT. § 253A.15(2) (1976).
95. Once the patient is hospitalized as mentally ill, however, a "label" such as
"schizophrenic" (the most common) is attached to him, which will color every activity of
his future life including discharge. Dr. Szasz maintains the label "frightens everyone,
including the doctors." See T. SzAsz, supra note 6, at 175-76; notes 43 & 44 supra.
96. See notes 36 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
97. See In re Lausche, 302 Minn. 65, 70, 225 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 993 (1975).
98. See id. at 70, 225 N.W.2d at 369. The Lausche court advanced further reasons for
not requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a mental patient should
remain confined: (1) It implied that a dangerous patient might thereby be released into
the public merely because he could not be treated; and, (2) it stated that the statutory
provisions for release did not intend the review proceeding to be what would in effect be
a recommitment. See id. at 69-70, 225 N.W.2d at 368-69.
99. See note 29 supra.
100. To justify a less protective burden and standard of proof at the release proceedings,
the state must advance an additional strong interest that it did not have at the original
commitment. If the initial commitment was for the purpose of treatment, and that treat-
ment has not been given, presumably the state should give evidence of a new and more
effective type of treatment that can be given in the future.
In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972),
the Court held that a prior conviction did not authorize less protective standards than
those required for other civil commitments. By analogy it can be argued that prior confine-
ment cannot be used as the necessary additional state interest to allow a lesser standard
at the release proceeding.
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Lausche court advanced is the increased administrative burden. Bal-
anced against the patient's interest in his liberty, the administrative
burden argument is not convincing, especially in light of the potentially
indefinite commitment allowed by the Minnesota statute. Due process
and fundamental fairness require that the standard and burden of proof
at the release proceeding protect a person from confinement for a mental
condition that would not have justified his original commitment. There-
fore, the standard and burden of proof should be the same as at the
original commitment.
V. A STATUTORY APPROACH
The approach to the standard and burden of proof for release proceed-
ings advocated in this Note is premised on the assumption that present
Minnesota statutes will remain unchanged. Even if more protective
safeguards are adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the mental
patient may still be protected inadequately because the present statu-
tory scheme allows indefinite commitment. A more thorough remedy
may be obtained by legislative action which provides for commitment
for a specified period.1" A good example is the recently-enacted Califor-
nia statute,102 which mandates consecutive recertification periods of
101. Several states have enacted determinate commitment statutes which mandate a
recommitment process after a specified time, thus effectively removing the burden of proof
from the patient. See, e.g., Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5151,
5152, 5206, 5230, 5250, 5254, 5260, 5264, 5300, 5304 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 394.467(3), (4) (West Supp. 1976) (new court order of retention required after first
six months of confinement; right to notice, hearing, counsel, and independent psychia-
trist; court can order retention for one year; once every year thereafter, new court order
required); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-506.3, .6 (1971) (after first six months, new court order
required every twelve months for retention of involuntary patient; hearing mandatory if
requested within fifteen days of notice to extend hospitalization); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91
1/2, § 10-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976) (judicial review once during first year and every two
years thereafter; superintendent must justify retention of patient); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34,
§ 2334(2) (Supp. 1976) (first commitment for four months; afterwards rehearing every
year); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 12 (1972) (automatic medical review annually; every
involuntary patient must be recertified annually); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:38
(Supp. 1975) (after two years order for commitment must be renewed by judicial hearing);
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 31.33 (McKinney 1976) (court-ordered commitments of six
months, one year, then two year periods; patient must affirmatively demand a court
hearing or commitment order solely on hospital's written application); N.C. GEN. STAT.
H9 122-58.8, .11 (Supp. 1975) (initial commitment for 90 days followed by automatic
discharge or rehearing; second commitment not to exceed 180 days; afterwards annual
review and rehearing); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 71.05.230, .240, .260, .280, .320 (1975 &
Supp. 1976) (after initial 72-hour detention, court may order 14-day detention at probable
cause hearing; additional 90-day confinement if patient threatened or attempted physical
harm to himself or others or committed felonious acts while committed or "is gravely
disabled"; then successive 180-day confinements if court ordered).
102. See Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5404.1 (West
1972 & Supp. 1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 9, 1976, ch. 110, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv.
19771
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fourteen days if additional treatment is recuired for an involuntarily
committed patient."3 Even a patient who has committed recent danger-
ous acts while in confinement must be recertified at the end of a ninety-
day period or else be released.'0' Studies 5 made of the results of these
mandatory release provisions indicate that the persons so released do
not present any greater danger to themselves or others'" and have as
208 (West); Act of Sept. 12, 1976, ch. 905, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2316 (West); Act of Sept.
20, 1976, ch. 1109, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4680 (West).
103. See Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5254, 5264 (West
1972). The Act provides for a 72-hour evaluation confinement upon a written allegation
of probable cause by a peace officer or "professional person." See id. § 5150 (West Supp.
1976). If the patient is then medically certified as dangerous or gravely disabled by mental
disorder, and he will not accept voluntary treatment, he may be institutionalized for up
to another 14 days for intensive treatment. See id. § 5250 (West 1972). The provisions
for a suicidal patient are similar, except that if he has either attempted or threatened to
take his own life during the time of hospitalization or has been committed for that
reason and continues to present an imminent threat of so doing, he may be postcertified
for a second 14 days. See id. § 5260. Both of these classes of patients must be released at
the end of those time periods unless they qualify for additional treatment under other
provisions of the statute. See, e.g., id. § 5300.
104. See id. §§ 5300, 5304 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976). The patient who is considered
imminently dangerous to others can be postcertified for an additional 90 days after the
intitial 14-day period, but only if the state meets a very heavy burden of proof. It must
be shown that the person has threatened or attempted to inflict physical harm on another
person after having been taken into custody and continues to present an imminent threat
of such harm or, in the alternative, that such an act was the precipitating factor in the
original confinement, and as a result of a continuing mental disorder he continues to
present such an imminent threat. See id. § 5300 (West 1972). This must be proved at a
full judicial hearing within four days of the filing of the petition, and the patient may
request a jury trial, in which case the verdict must be unanimous. See id. §§ 5302, 5303.
At the end of the 90-day period, the patient must be released unless the procedure is again
followed, in which case commitment can be for an additional 90 days only. See id. § 5304
(West Supp. 1976).
105. See, e.g., A. URMER, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-
1970), portions reprinted in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL
HEALTH PROCESS 264-67, 289-90, 403-11 (2d ed. 1976). Criticisms that the Lausche court
made and implied of a determinate recommitment procedure can be answered by exami-
nation of the results of the experimental Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which looks to an
eventual phaseout of involuntary commitments into state hospitals. Three major criti-
cisms were made prior to enactment of that statute, and they correspond to the three
classes of patients involuntarily committed: (1) those in need of treatment; (2) those
dangerous to themselves; and (3) those dangerous to others. It was feared that because of
the mandatory release patients would not receive an adequate amount of treatment, that
suicidal patients would not be helped, and that dangerous patients would be released too
early for the community's safety.
106. See A. URMER, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-1970),
reprinted in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS
265 (2d ed. 1976). Criticism of the Act before its passage was that a mandatory release
would result in increased danger to the patients themselves, because suicidal patients
would often have to be released against their doctor's advice. The results of the study
impressively refute this contention. In a cohort group of 300 individuals used in the study,
[Vol. 3
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good a prognosis for later adjustment '07 as do patients confined much
longer under indeterminate commitment statutes. The California ap-
proach, and others like it, deserve serious consideration, and, if adopted
in Minnesota, would go far to alleviate the existing procedural inade-
quacies of the mental commitment and release process.
VI. CONCLUSION
A judicial change in the burden and standard of proof in the proceed-
ings for release of a committed mental patient has been advocated in
this Note. By imposing the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the patient is still mentally ill or mentally ill and dangerous on the
petitioning party, the release proceeding would be changed, in effect, to
a recommitment process. In addition, the proposed statutory change
would mandate a series of recommitment proceedings at specific inter-
vals in lieu of release proceedings. Whether this increased protection is
provided to the committed patient by the legislature or by the courts is
not a single one had committed suicide at the end of six months, a significant indication
that early, required release of persons does not appear to influence suicide rates. An
additional indication that a determinate scheme may even improve the suicidal patient's
chances of recovery is the fact that the doctors chose to utilize the additional 14 days
available for continued treatment in only one per cent of the cases studied.
The most innovative restrictions placed on the commitment process by the California
statute concern the confinement of persons dangerous to others. The Act requires definite
evidence of actual dangerous acts before a person can be postcertified for the additional
90-day period. This requirement was included to refute the common belief that mental
patients are usually dangerous persons, and because of the lack of reliability of predictions
of dangerous behavior and the lack of proof that treatment was any deterrent to that
behavior. The study, along with court records for that period, disclosed that this much
shorter period of confinement caused no increase in the occurrence of dangerous behavior
and did not increase the risk to the community. This was the result even though most
patients were not even recertified for the additional 90-day period and were only confined
for the original 14 days.
107. See A. URMER, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1969-1970),
reprinted in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS
404 (2d ed. 1976). California's primary legislative change was placement of a limit on the
length of time a person could be hospitalized for mental disorder. One of the major
arguments against determinate commitment is that a patient cannot be adequately
treated within the legal time and the confinement will, therefore, have a negative effect
upon him. Although the Lausche court did not make this argument, it has been raised as
a criticism of many protective release procedures. In a study made comparing various
factors before and after the new statute, several pertinent findings were made. No signifi-
cant difference was found in the psychiatrist's prognosis for the patient's recovery and
adjustment between the patients released before and after enactment of the new statute;
therefore, having the patient committed until the hospital considered him ready for dis-
charge resulted in no better prognosis for his recovery. In addition, while the prognosis
for voluntary patients did not change, it was significantly better for involuntary patients
with the mandatory release provision. The implications of this result are that the longer
periods of confinement and treatment are often not justified for an involuntary patient.
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less important than the need that it somehow be provided. In this way
we can prevent the imposition of possible life sentences, however benev-
olently intended, on both prospective mental patients and those already
committed.
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